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Certain and Uncertain Inference with Trivalent Conditionals
Workshop on Non-Contradictory Logics, Ruhr University Bochum
Probabilistic Reasoning with Non-Monotonic Conditionals
Reasoning with Imperfect Information in Social Settings, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
The Productive Explanation Model in Psychological Science
Emerging Ideas in Philosophy of Science, Belgrade (keynote)
Certain and Uncertain Inference with Trivalent Conditionals
SIFA Conference, Alessandria
The Productive Explanation Model in Psychological Science
Triennial SILFS Conference, University of Urbino
Certain and Uncertain Inference with Trivalent Conditionals
PROGIC23, University of Amsterdam
The Productive Explanation Model in Psychological Science
Research Colloquium, University of Gdansk
The Productive Explanation Model in Psychological Science
Research Colloquium, University of Salzburg
Counterfactuals: Semantics, Logic and Probability
Science & More work in progress seminar, University of Turin
The Productive Explanation Model in Psychological Science
Philosophy of Science Research Seminar, University of Pavia
Indicative Conditionals: Semantics, Logic and Probability
16th Graduate Conference in Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, University of Cambridge (keynote)
Counterfactuals: Semantics, Logic and Probability
LINGUAE Seminar, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris
The Productive Explanation Model in Psychological Science
Science and More Research Seminar, University of Turin
Lewis's Counterfactuals as Strict Stalnaker Conditionals
Annual PRIN Workshop "From Models to Decisions", Castelveccana
Severe Testing in Bayesian Inference
Research Seminar, University of Valencia
Indicative Conditionals: Trivalent Semantics and Probabilistic Reasoning
Research Seminar, LOGOS group, University of Barcelona
Indicative Conditionals: Trivalent Semantics and Probabilistic Reasoning
Research Seminar, University of Florence
Indicative Conditionals: Trivalent Semantics and Probabilistic Reasoning (with Lorenzo Rossi)
LLC Research Seminar, University of Turin
Symposium on Bayesian Models in Philosophy of Science.
Discussants: Stephan Hartmann, Christopher Hitchcock, John Norton, Mike Titelbaum, and myself.
PSA20/21, Baltimore (online session).
Causal Attribution and Partial Liability: A Probabilistic Model.
EPSA21, Turin.
Book discussion "Bayesian Philosophy of Science".
University of Pittsburgh graduate student seminar (online session).
Statistical Inference in Psychology: Severity in Bayesian Inference, and anything else you always wanted to know about statistics (with Noah van Dongen).
Workshop "Scientific Models and Scientific Inference", Castelveccana.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science: A Guide for Hypothesis Testing in Psychology.
Cognitive Science Colloquium, University of Tübingen (online session).
Causal Attribution and Partial Liability: A Probabilistic Model.
EENPS 2020/21, Belgrade (online session).
Bayesian Networks in Philosophy.
Arizona State University graduate student seminar (online session).
Tutorial on "Significance Testing and Severe Testing" (with Noah van Dongen).
Perspectives on Scientific Error 4, Castelveccana.
EPSA Symposium: A New Look on Objectivity in Science.
EPSA19, Geneva.
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference with Idealized Models.
"Bayes By the Sea" Conference, Ancona.
Scientific Philosophy: The Bayesian Way
"Bayes By the Sea" Summer School, Ancona.
Degree of Corroboration: An Antidote to the Replication Crisis.
Perspectives on Scientific Error 3/12th MuST Conference in Philosophy of Science, Munich.
De Finettian Logics for Indicative Conditionals.
FEW 2019 (presentation given by Lorenzo Rossi), Turin.
Conditionals, Causality, and Probability Judgments: an experimental study.
FEW 2019 (poster presentation), Turin.
De Finettian Logics for Indicative Conditionals.
INALCO summer school on conditionals, Paris.
Degree of Corroboration: An Antidote to the Replication Crisis.
Symposium on Philosophy of Statistics, Durham (UK).
Meta-Analysis and Conflicts of Interest.
Conference "Bias in Science" (joint presentation with Lorenzo Casini), Munich.
Statistical Hypothesis Testing and Measures of Corroboration.
Part of the Symposium "The Replication Crisis: How Should Science Change?"
Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Seattle.
Tutorial on Philosophy of Statistics.
Perspectives on Scientific Error 2, Groningen.
Causality, Probability and Conditionals: an experimental study.
Science & More Talks, Turin.
The Semantics of Conditionals: The Return of the Trivalent Knights.
Keynote at the Bayes by the Sea workshop, Ancona.
The Semantics of Conditionals: The Return of the Trivalent Knights.
Keynote at the FINO Graduate Conference, Novara/Vercelli.
Statistical Hypothesis Testing Meets Philosophy of Science: Towards a Measure of Corroboration.
Physics Departmental Colloquium, University of Turin, Turin.
Semantic Intuitions: A Meta-Analysis.
Seminar of the Philosophy Department, Santiago de Compostela.
Statistical Hypothesis Testing Meets Philosophy of Science: Towards a Measure of Corroboration.
META Lecture, Politecnico di Milano, Milan.
Chess and Human Creativity in the Machine Age.
John Cabot University, Rome.
The Semantics of Conditionals: The Return of the Trivalent Knights.
3rd EUNOC Workshop on Non-Categorical Reasoning, Amsterdam.
The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Decision-Making.
Keynote at the conference "Our Species and Its Responsibilities---An Ontology for the Environmental Crisis", Turin.
A Bayesian Unification of Causal Strength and Explanatory Power.
VIU Meeting on Causal Explanation, Venice.
Conditionals and Causality.
Keynote at the Conference "Inferentialism, Bayesianism and Scientific Explanation", LMU Munich.
Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.
Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan.
Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way.
EPSA 17, Exeter.
The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.
Annual Meeting of the BSPS, Edinburgh.
Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way.
Workshop "Perspectives on Scientific Error", Tilburg.
Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way.
Triennal Conference of the SILFS, Bologna.
Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way.
Reasoning Club Conference, Turin.
Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures.
Pacific Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Seattle.
Scientific Self-Correction: The Bayesian Way.
Departmental Seminar, University of Sydney, Sydney.
Foundations for a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.
10th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg (MuST) Conference "Causation and Complexity", Sydney.
Conditional Degree of Belief.
Departmental Seminar, Hong Kong University, Hong Kong.
Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures.
Departmental Seminar, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.
The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism
Workshop on the Occasion of Marta Sznajder's PhD Defense, Groningen.
Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power.
TiLPS Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Foundations for a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.
Workshop "Realism, Progress, and Cognitive Values", Trieste University.
Scientific Objectivity and the Replication Crisis in Psychology.
5th René Descartes Lectures, Tilburg University.
Foundations for a Theory of Causal Strength.
Causality in the Sciences of the Mind and Brain, Aarhus University.
Conditional Degree of Belief.
Chance Encounter, University of Groningen.
Foundations for a Theory of Causal Strength.
FEW 2016, University of Groningen.
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.
Popper Seminar, London School of Economics.
Applying a Measure of Corroboration in Statistical Inference.
MuST 9: Evidence, Inference and Risk, LMU Munich.
Foundations for a Theory of Causal Strength.
Logic and Interactive Rationality Seminar, ILLC Amsterdam.
Conditional Degrees of Belief.
TiLPS Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.
Symposium "Measure sensitivity and robust model-based argumentation in the study of reasoning and cognition" (with Peter Brössel, Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa and Michael Schippers).
Bi-annual Conference of the European Society for Philosophy of Science "EPSA15", Düsseldorf.
Explanatory Value and Probabilistic Reasoning.
Colloquium of the Gießener Abendgespräche Kognition und Gehirn, Gießen.
Symposium "Measure sensitivity and robust model-based argumentation in the study of reasoning and cognition" (with Peter Brössel, Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Michael Schippers).
Conference "Model-Based Reasoning in Science" (MBR015), Sestri Levante.
Statistical Reasoning and Conditional Probability.
Conference "Model-Based Reasoning in Science" (MBR015), Sestri Levante.
Graded Causation and Explanatory Power, Explicated Probabilistically.
Conference "Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning", Munich.
Conditional Degrees of Belief.
Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, Torino.
Statistical Reasoning and Conditional Probability.
8th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg (MuST) Conference "Objectivity in Science", Tilburg.
Explanatory Value and Probabilistic Reasoning.
Colloquium of the Tilburg Center for Cognition and Communication (TiCC), Tilburg.
Statistical Reasoning and Conditional Probability.
Conference "PROGIC15", Canterbury.
Explanation, Causation and Probability.
Annual Meeting of the DFG Priority Program "New Frameworks of Rationality", Etelsen.
Scientific Objectivity and Popperian Corroboration.
Philosophical Colloquium, Department of Values, Technology and Innovation, TU Delft.
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.
Epistemology Reading Group, MIT, Cambridge/MA.
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.
Lunchtime talk, Center for Philosophy of Science, Pittsburgh University, Pittsburgh.
Explicating Degree of Corroboration.
Colloquium, Department of Statistics, Duke University, Durham/NC.
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.
Lunchtime talk, philosophy of science group, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
The Probablistic No Miracles Argument.
TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.
The Probablistic No Miracles Argument.
Keynote at the conference "Non-Causal Explanations in the Sciences", Munich.
Explicating Degree of Corroboration.
Workshop "Full and Partial Belief", Tilburg University, Tilburg.
The Probablistic No Miracles Argument.
Workshop on Norms of Reasoning, Bochum.
Corroboration and Evidential Support: An Explication of Popper's Criticial Rationalism.
SILFS 2014 (Congress of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science), Rome.
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.
41st Philosophy of Science conference, Dubrovnik.
An Introduction to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (III): From Evidential Support to a Measure of Corroboration.
TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.
Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Reasoning.
3rd meeting of the DFG priority program 1516 "New Frameworks of Rationality", Schloss Etelsen.
Corroboration and Evidential Support: An Explication of Popper's Criticial Rationalism.
Keynote at the Philogica III conference (Third Colombian congress of Logic, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science), Bogota.
Measuring Explanatory Power.
ANT Cluster on Mind and Cognition, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Modeling Expertise in Group Decisions.
Workshop "Deliberation, Aggregation, Consensus", Ecole normale supérieure, Paris.
Measuring Explanatory Power.
Workshop "Operationalization 2013", Freiburg University, Freiburg/Germany.
An Introduction to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (II): The Problem of Old Evidence.
Tutorial in the TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.
An Introduction to Bayesian Confirmation Theory (I): Confirmation Measures.
Tutorial in the TiLPS Seminar on Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg.
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.
Workshop on the History of Economic Modeling, London School of Economics, LSE.
Beyond the Randomized Controlled Trial: Designing and Interpreting Experiments in Medicine. Symposium with Cecilia Nardini, Roger Stanev, and David Teira.
Biennal Meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA13), Helsinki.
Tutorial on "Theory Change: From Popper to Bayes (and back)".
Second Reasoning Club Conference, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa.
Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
NVWF Conference "Philosophy of Science in a Forest", Leusden.
Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
Annual IUC conference on Philosophy of Science, Dubrovnik.
Could Popper have been a Bayesian? On the Corroboration of Statistical Hypotheses.
Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Conference ``Models and Decisions'', Munich.
A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Commentary on R. Morey and J.W. Romeijn: "Science and belief: A plea for epistemic statistics"
Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, Rotterdam.
A Bayesian Network Model of Disagreement.
Conference Epistemic groups and collaborative research in science, Nancy.
Testing a Precise Null Hypothesis: The Case of Lindley's Paradox.
Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, San Diego.
Measuring the Grammar of Explanatory Power (with Matteo Colombo).
Workshop Operationalizing Epistemic Concepts, Aachen.
The No Alternatives Argument.
Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW) 2012, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, M\FCnchen.
Probabilistic Explications of Explanatory Power.
Workshop on Explanatory Power, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universit\E4t Bochum, Bochum.
The No Alternatives Argument.
5th Sydney-Tilburg Conference: The Progress of Science, Tilburg.
Judgement and Behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Impact of Moral and Strategic Considerations.
Erasmus Institute in Philosophy and Economics (EIPE) Research Seminar, Rotterdam.
Explanatory Power: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations (with Matteo Colombo).
DFG Priority Program "New Frameworks of Rationality, Tutzing.
Objectivity, Bayesianism and Climate Models.
Workshop on Radical Uncertainty (R&D Network), Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Munich.
Explaining Language: Philosophical Perspectives on e-humanities.
Launch Meeting of the e-Humanities Lab, Tilburg School of Humanities, Tilburg.
Judgement and Behaviour in the Prisoner's Dilemma: The Impact of Moral and Strategic Considerations.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (presented by Dominik Klein).
Conference The Collective Dimension of Science, Nancy.
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes
Departmental Seminar, Philosophy Department of Uppsala University, Uppsala.
Climate Models, Robustness and Bayesianism. Part of a symposium on the
reliability of climate models, with Seamus Bradley, Arthur Petersen,
Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl.
Biennal Meeting of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA11), University of Athens, Athens.
The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (with Dominik Klein).
Formal Epistemology Meets Experimental Philosophy Workshop, TiLPS, Tilburg University.
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes
Causality and Explanation in the Sciences (CaEitS 2011), University of Ghent, Ghent.
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes
Seventh Congress of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP 7), Milan.
Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
Departmental Colloquium, Institute of Philosophy, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe.
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
Decisions, Games and Logic Workshop (DGL11), Maastricht.
The Epistemic Benefits of Expert Recognition for Group Decisions (with Dominik Klein).
Workshop on Expert Judgment, TU Delft, Delft.
R\E9alit\E9 priv\E9e et langage: peut-on instituer une r\E8gle?
UFR de Lettres et Philosophie, Universit\E9 de la Bourgogne, Dijon.
Consensus Through Mutual Respect: Scope and Limits.
3rd meeting of the NWO-funded network "Rationality and Decision", London School of Economics, London.
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
4th Sydney-Tilburg Conference The
Authority of Science, University of Sydney, Sydney.
How Do Hypothesis Tests Provide Scientific Evidence? Reconciling Karl Popper and Thomas Bayes.
Philosophy Seminar, School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics, University of Queensland, Brisbane.
Explicating the Precautionary Principle.
Research Seminar, Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA), University of Melbourne, Melbourne.
The Precautionary Principle: Robust Environmental Decisions.
Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.
Bayesian Philosophy of Science.
Philosophy Seminar Series, Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
How Objective is Objective Bayesianism?
REHSEIS Workshop on Philosophy and Statistics,
Universit\E9 Paris VII (Denis Diderot), Paris.
The Precautionary Principle: Robust Environmental Decisions.
TiLPS Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,
Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Symposium on Environmental Decision-Making (with James Justus, Helen Regan, and Katie Steele).
Biennal
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Montr\E9al.
Towards a Bayesian Account of Explanatory Power.
Biennal
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Montr\E9al.
Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness.
Departmental Seminar, Section Philosophy & Ethics of TU Eindhoven, Eindhoven.
How objective (and how Bayesian) is Objective Bayesianism?
Pluralism
in the Foundations of Statistics, University of Kent, Canterbury.
The Logic of Explanatory Power (presented by Jonah Schupbach).
Formal Epistemology Workshop 2010, University of Konstanz, Konstanz.
The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations (presented by Remco Heesen).
Formal Epistemology Workshop 2010, University of Konstanz,
Konstanz.
The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations.
Hoernl\E9 Research Seminar, Philosophy Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Evidence and Stopping Rules in Sequential Trials.
Bayesian Statistics 9,
Valencia/Benidorm.
Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness.
Modeling
in the Social and Behavioral Sciences I, IHPST Paris, Paris.
Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness.
Philosophy
of Science in a Forest, Internationale Schol voor Wijsbegeerte,
Leusden.
Global vs. Local Decision-Making: A Plea for Robustness
Departmental Colloquium, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Statistical Evidence, Objectivity and Public Policy.
3rd
Sydney-Tilburg Conference The
Future of Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Philosophy of Science as Scientific Philosophy (with Stephan Hartmann).
Scientific
Philosophy: Past and Future, Tilburg University, Tilburg.
Scientific Philosophy (with Stephan
Hartmann).
TiLPS
Research Seminar in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,
Tilburg University, Tilburg.
The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations
Formal
Philosophy Seminar, Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven, Leuven.
The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations (with Remco Heesen)
Choice
Group,
London School of Economics, London.
The Virtue of Simplicity Revisited: A Model Averaging Perspective.
EPSA 09, Amsterdam.
The Logic of Explanatory Power (with Jonah Schupbach).
European Science Foundation Workshop on "Physical and Philosophical Perspectives on Probability, Explanation and Time", Woudschouten.
The Logic of Explanatory Power (with
Jonah Schupbach).
PROGIC 09, Groningen.
Commentary on Alvin Goldman's
work in Social Epistemology.
4th Cologne Summer School in
Philosophy, K\F6ln.
The Virtue of Simplicity Revisited: A Model Averaging
Perspective.
Modeling the
World - Perspectives from Biology and Economics, TINT Conference, Helsinki.
The
Virtue of Simplicity: More Complex Than Akaike's Theorem.
Colloquium Talk, Australian Centre of Excellence for Risk Analysis (ACERA),
Melbourne.
How Much Do Experts Count? (with Stephan Hartmann)
2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference Evidence, Science and Public Policy, Sydney.
The Virtue of Simplicity: More Complex Than Akaike's Theorem.
2nd Sydney-Tilburg Conference Evidence, Science and Public Policy, Sydney.
Artefactual Probability.
Philosophical
Society, Australian National University, Canberra.
Commentary on Abdellaoui, Barrios
and Wakker: "Reconciling introspective utility with revealed preference: Experimental arguments
based on prospect theory".
Erasmus Institute
in Philosophy and Economics (EIPE) Research Seminar, Rotterdam.
Sources of
Disagreement Among Rational Agents.
3rd VAF conference,
Tilburg.
Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials.
Philosophy of Science Association (PSA)
Biennial Meeting, Pittsburgh.
Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential
Trials.
2nd Meeting on
Philosophy, Probability and Scientific Method, Valencia.
Compromise, Consensus and Judgment Aggregation.
6th conference of the International
Network for Economic Methodology (INEM), Madrid.
Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation.
Bayes Savaged in the Extreme Conference, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, Bergen.
Pragmatism in Formal Modeling: Two Case Studies.
Pragmatism and Naturalism Workshop, Tilburg.
Science without models: Resampling simulations in statistical inference.
London-Paris-Tilburg Workshop in
Philosophy of Science, Paris.
Statistics do not require frequentist justifications.
First Conference of the European Association for
Philosophy of Science (EPSA), Madrid.
Science without models: Resampling
simulations in statistical inference.
Models and Simulations 2,
Tilburg University.
Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science.
Third PROGIC workshop,
Canterbury.
Statistics between inductive logic and empirical science.
TiLPS Colloquium, Tilburg.
A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation.
Annual meeting of the British
Society for Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Bristol.
--->Download PDF slides
A confirmation-theoretic model of
explanation.
Formal Epistemology
Workshop (FEW), Pittsburgh.
--->Download
PDF slides
A confirmation-theoretic model of explanation.
Annual
meeting of the Canadian Society for History and
Philosophy of Science / Soci\E9t\E9 canadienne pour l'histoire et la philosophie des sciences
(CSHPS/SCHPS), Saskatoon.
--->Download PDF
slides
Falsificationist confirmation.
35th annual meeting of the Society
for Exact Philosophy (SEP), Vancouver.
Surprise and evidence in statistical model
checking.
Foundations of the Formal
Sciences VI, Amsterdam.
--->Download PDF slides
Bayeisanism, unification and coherence.
GAP.6
conference, Berlin.
--->Download PDF
slides
Bayesian confirmation: No inductive logic.
Philosophical Research
Colloquium, University of Düsseldorf.