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2017 and forthcoming
Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures (with Jacob Stegenga). Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science.
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration. Forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Discussion: Beyond Subjective and Objective in Bayesian Statistics. Forthcoming in Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A. (Invited commentary on this paper by Andrew Gelman and Christian Hennig.)
Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise (with Carlo Martini), to appear in Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson and Michael Weisberg (eds.): Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Probabilistic No Miracles Argument. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6: 173--189.
Confirmation and Induction, in Paul Humphreys (ed.): Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, 185--209. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference, in Alan Hájek and Chris Hitchcock (eds.): Handbook of the Philosophy of Probability, 382--405. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bayésianisme versus fréquentisme en inférence statistique, in Isabelle Drouet (ed.): Le Bayésianisme aujourd'hui, 167--192. Paris: Editions matériologiques.
Explanatory Value, Probability and Abductive Inference (with Matteo Colombo and Marie Postma-Nilsenová). In: Papafragou, A., Grodner, D., Mirman, D., and Trueswell, J.C. (eds.). Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 432--437. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence. Philosophy of Science 82: 383--401.
Modeling Expertise in Group Decisions (with Dominik Klein). Economics and Philosophy 31: 3--25.
The No Alternatives Argument (with Richard Dawid and Stephan Hartmann). The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66: 213--234. This paper has also been covered on the OUP Press Blog and the online edition of The Guardian.
The Learnability of Auditory Center-embedded Recursion (with Jun Lai and Emiel Krahmer). In D.C. Noelle et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2015), 1237--1243. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Disagreement Under the Veil of Ignorance (with Mark Colyvan, Chiara Lisciandra, Carlo Martini, Ryan Muldoon and Giacomo Sillari). Philosophical Studies 170: 377--394.
The Predictive Mind and Chess-Playing. A Reply to Shand (2014) (with Matteo Colombo). Analysis 74: 603--608.
On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms (with Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Cristina Bicchieri, and Stephan Hartmann). Philosophy, Politics and Economics 13: 3--22.
Scientific Objectivity (with Julian Reiss), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Ed Zalta), Stanford/CA: CSLI.
Studying Frequency Effects in Learning Center-embedded Recursion (with Jun Lai and Emiel Krahmer). In P. Bello, M. Guarini, M. McShane, & B. Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2014), 797--802. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
Bias and Conditioning in Sequential Medical Trials (with Cecilia Nardini). Philosophy of Science 80: 1053--1064.
Testing a Precise Null Hypothesis: The Case of Lindley's Paradox. Philosophy of Science 80: 733--744.
A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Erkenntnis 78: 727--738.
Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect (with Mark Colyvan and Carlo Martini). Erkenntnis 78: 881--898.
The Role of Bayesian Philosophy within Bayesian Model Selection. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3: 101--114.
The Ethics of Statistical Testing (with David Teira), in Christoph Luetge (ed.): Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, 1535--1549. Berlin: Springer.
Environmental Risk Analysis: Robustness is Essential for Precaution. Philosophy of Science 79: 881--892. (Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Montréal, 2010)
Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth (with Stephan Hartmann). Synthese 187: 209--221.
The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo's Reference Bayesianism. Rationality, Markets and Morality 3: 1–13. Special Issue "Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should) They Meet in 2011 and Beyond?", edited by D. Mayo, A. Spanos and K. Staley.
Discussion: Integrated Objective Bayesian Estimation and Hypothesis Testing (by José M. Bernardo), in José M. Bernardo et al. (eds.): Bayesian Statistics 9: Proceedings of the Ninth Valencia International Meeting, 47--48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Bounded Strength of Weak Expectations (with Remco Heesen). Mind 120: 819--832.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 6: 497--508.
Science without (Parametric) Models: The Case of Bootstrap Resampling. Synthese 180: 65--76.
The Logic of Explanatory Power (with Jonah Schupbach). Philosophy of Science 78: 105--127.
Mathematics and Statistics in the Social Sciences (with Stephan Hartmann), in Ian C. Jarvie and Jesús Zamora Bonilla (eds.): The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, 594--612. London: SAGE.
The Weight of Competence Under a Realistic Loss Function (with Stephan Hartmann). The Logic Journal of the IGPL 18: 346--352.
Probability, Rational Single-Case Decisions and the Monty Hall Problem. Synthese 174: 331--340.
Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation (with Stephan Hartmann and Gabriella Pigozzi). Journal for Logic and Computation 20: 603--617.
Bayesian Epistemology (with Stephan Hartmann), in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.): Routledge Companion to Epistemology, 609--620. London: Routledge.
Hempel and the Paradoxes of Confirmation, in Dov Gabbay, Stephan Hartmann and John Woods (eds.): Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 10 (Inductive Logic), 231--260. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Statistical Inference Without Frequentist Justifications, in M. Suárez et al. (eds.): EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. I, 289--297. Berlin: Springer.
Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials. Philosophy of Science 76: 637--649.
Statistics between Inductive Logic and Empirical Science, Journal of Applied Logic 7: 239--250.
Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers (with Stephan Hartmann and Carlo Martini). Episteme 6: 110--129.
Guest Editor of a special issue of Synthese: "Objectivity in Science" (forthcoming). With Matteo Colombo, Mark Colyvan, Raoul Gervais, Paul Griffiths, and Stephan Hartmann.
Guest Editor of a special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Volume 46, No. 1): "The Progress of Science". With Stephan Hartmann and Rogier De Langhe. 2014.
→ Editors' Introduction.
Guest Editor of a special issue of Synthese (Volume 191, No. 1): "The Collective Dimension of Science". With Cyrille Imbert, Ryan Muldoon and Kevin Zollman. 2014.
→ Editors' Introduction.
Guest Editor of a special issue of The European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Volume 2, No. 2): "The Future of Philosophy of Science". With Stephan Hartmann. 2012.
→ Editors' Introduction.
Guest Editor of a special issue of The Logic Journal of the IGPL (Volume 18. No. 2): "Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology". With Stephan Hartmann and Carlo Martini. 2010.
→ Editors' Introduction.
R. Haenni, J.W. Romeijn, G. Wheeler and J. Williamson: Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks, Springer: Berlin, 2011. Metascience 21: 459--462. 2012.
Guest Editor of The Reasoner, Volume 7, No. 12 (December 2013). Editorial and Interview with Clark Glymour.
Precaution with the Precautionary Principle, Decision Point 48: 7. 2011.
Grootste problemen van NL: Zorg, pensioen, EU, klimaat, migratie. (In Dutch.) De Groene Amsterdammer. 19 April 2011.
Guest Editor of The Reasoner, Volume 4, No. 10 (October 2010). Editorial on Philosophy in Africa.
Guest Editor of The Reasoner, Volume 3, No. 7 (July 2009). Editorial and Interview with Mark Colyvan.
Some of these papers change quickly. Sometimes I get a question about a paper where I have, in the meantime, changed my views. If you are seriously interested in the topic, just drop me a note, and I will send you the most recent version.
Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality and Statistical Relevance (with Leandra Bucher and Matteo Colombo)
Challenging the Dichotomy of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values: Feminist Values and Evolutionary Psychology (with Silvia Ivani)
Conditional Degree of Belief
The Objectivity of Subjective Bayesian Inference
Foundations for a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength